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ABSTRACT
This paper provides an assessment of Russia’s 
long-term growth prospects. In particular, it 
addresses the question of the medium- and 
long-term sustainability of the country’s 
currently high growth rates. Starting from the 
notion that Russia’s fast economic expansion in 
recent years has benefited from a number of 
singular factors such as the unprecedented rise 
in oil prices, the paper presents new evidence 
on Russia’s oil price dependency using a Vector 
Error Correction Model (VECM) framework. 
The findings indicate that the positive impact 
of rising oil prices on Russia’s GDP growth has 
increased in recent years, but tends to be 
buffered by an appreciation of the real effective 
exchange rate which is stimulating imports. 
Additionally, there is empirical confirmation 
that growth in the service sector – a symptom 
usually associated with the Dutch disease 
phenomenon – is mainly a result of the transition 
process. Finally, the paper provides an overview 
of the relevant factors that are likely to affect 
Russia’s growth performance in the future.
JEL classification: O43, O 47, O51, O11, O14
Keywords: Russia, economic growth5
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
This paper addresses the question of whether 
Russia’s currently high growth rates are likely 
to be sustained over the medium to longer term. 
In particular, the paper presents new evidence 
on how Russia’s oil price dependency has 
evolved over recent years. It also discusses the 
country’s medium to longer term growth 
outlook.
In the first section, the paper analyses the role 
of the oil and gas industries in the Russian 
economy. Its findings indicate that the role of 
these industries has increased in nominal terms 
but less so in real terms. An econometric 
analysis of the sensitivity of Russia’s GDP 
growth to oil prices and the real exchange rate 
suggests that 1) the observed de-coupling of 
growth from rising oil prices over the past few 
years does not imply that growth is no longer 
sensitive to oil price fluctuations and 2) one 
explanation of the de-coupling phenomenon 
may be the surge of imports, triggered by real 
appreciation. Additionally, the section finds 
limited evidence of symptoms of the Dutch 
disease.
The second section of the paper assesses 
Russia’s medium- and long-term growth outlook 
from two perspectives. The time series 
perspective, i.e. an extrapolation of historical 
GDP data suggests that Russia’s current growth 
momentum is strong. However, a number of 
factors such as structural breaks and the need 
for a further restructuring of the Russian 
economy suggest that inferences from past 
historical data should be treated with caution. 
From a cross-country perspective, maintaining 
the current high growth rates would appear to 
be a considerable challenge. While Russia’s 
high level of human capital suggests that the 
country may have brighter growth prospects 
than other emerging market economies, other 
factors – such as the country’s low investment 
rate and the fact that its natural resource 
endowment may become a curse rather than a 
blessing in the longer-term – point to a more 
challenging growth outlook. In addition, 
demographic and health issues have to be 
addressed in order to limit their potentially 
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INTRODUCTION
Interest in Russia’s longer term economic 
prospects is on the increase. The recent rapid 
economic expansion of the Russian economy 
has contributed considerably to raising living 
standards in Russia and narrowing the income 
gap vis-à-vis other emerging markets and the 
euro area. The increasing market size of the 
Russian economy has started to attract greater 
inflows of foreign direct investment which 
traditionally has been low in Russia. Similarly, 
rating upgrades and improved earnings 
prospects backed by strong economic growth 
have resulted in the inclusion of Russian assets 
in the standard emerging market portfolios of 
international investors. Consequently, Russia’s 
importance for global financial stability has 
been increasing. In addition, Russia, the second-
largest oil producer in the world, has contributed 
significantly to the increase in the global oil 
supply over the past few years. The longer-term 
outlook for the Russian economy is therefore 
not only of interest to the Russian authorities 
and citizens who have a natural interest in the 
further improvement of livings standards but 
also to policy-makers in mature economies and 
international investors.
Russia’s dependence on natural resource 
extraction has raised some concerns about the 
sustainability of the current high growth rates. 
Over the past five years, Russia has enjoyed a 
period of strong growth. Even when allowing 
for the fact that the country has – as any 
emerging market economy with comparable 
levels of income – a substantial “catching-up” 
potential, recent growth rates of 6-7% per 
annum appear exceptionally high. Apparently, 
this high rate of economic expansion has been 
due to a number of singular factors such as the 
unprecedented rise in oil prices, the gain in 
competitiveness following the 1998 devaluation 
of the rouble and rapid increases in total factor 
productivity. The assumption that these factors 
are unlikely to last into the future has triggered 
a discussion about the sustainability of Russia’s 
current high growth rates and its medium to 
longer-term growth potential.1 In particular, it 
has been argued that Russia’s dependence on 
natural resource extraction may be aggravated 
in the future by what has become known as the 
“Dutch disease”, i.e. a situation in which real 
appreciation – triggered by surging commodity 
prices – crowds out manufacturing and other 
non-oil exports. In addition to the Dutch disease 
concerns, most assessments of Russia’s 
medium- and long-term growth potential point 
to structural challenges such as capacity 
constraints due to insufficient investment, 
banking sector weaknesses, negative 
demographic trends and health issues. On the 
other hand, it is sometimes argued that Russia’s 
GDP growth has de-coupled from oil prices in 
recent years. Some observers have concluded 
from this observation that the current strong 
growth momentum can be maintained without 
further oil price increases. 
This paper examines first whether the Russian 
economy has become more or less dependent 
on the oil and gas industries and whether 
symptoms of the Dutch disease are already 
visible in current economic data. The second 
section addresses Russia’s medium- and long-
term growth outlook from both a time-series 
and a cross-country perspective. The paper ends 
with a summary of the main conclusions.
1  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON RUSSIA’S OIL 
PRICE DEPENDENCE AND THE RISK OF THE 
DUTCH DISEASE
Russia’s oil price dependence and the risk of 
the Dutch disease are often considered as the 
main long-term challenges to sustainable 
growth in the country. In this regard, it is worth 
studying the available economic data for 
evidence of these phenomena. This section 
examines whether in Russia:
–  exports have become more biased towards 
oil and gas (Section 1.1)
1  See for example Ahrend (2004), Beck and Schularick (2003) 
and World Bank (2003).7
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– domestic production has become more oil 
and gas-dependent (Section 1.2)
–  GDP growth has become more sensitive to 
oil price fluctuations (Section 1.3)
– the economy is showing symptoms of the 
Dutch disease (section 1.4).
1.1  THE ROLE OF RAW MATERIALS IN RUSSIA’S 
EXPORTS
Crude oil is currently Russia’s most important 
export commodity. The massive growth in oil 
export revenues, however, is mainly due to the 
sharp spikes in oil prices. As the upper panel of 
Chart 1 illustrates, while the physical volume 
of Russian crude oil exports has been rising at 
a relatively moderate pace, oil export revenues 
have increased by between 35% and 50% each 
year during the same period.
A similar trend is observed in the volume and 
value of natural gas exports. In fact, gas export 
revenues also rose faster than quantities, but 
owing to the long-term nature of natural gas 
contracts prices are generally more stable.2 As 
Chart 1 (lower panel) shows, significant 
increases in gas export revenues occurred in 
2000, 2003 and 2005, most likely on account of 
contract re-negotiations.
Consequently, Russia’s dependence on exports 
of natural resources is significant in nominal 
terms, but less pronounced in real terms. As 
Table 1 indicates, the share of oil and oil 
products in total exports rose with the increase 
in oil prices. However, the increase in the share 
of oil exports – measured in constant 2000 
prices – was more subdued. The share of natural 
gas in total exports has been declining in both 
nominal and real terms during the period under 
review.3
Table 1 Share of oil in total exports 
(as a percentage)
Sources: Bank of Russia, WEO and ECB calculations.
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Current prices 31.0 29.8 32.8 34.9 38.1 43.4
2000 prices 31.0 33.1 35.1 36.6 36.4 37.6
2  In contrast, Russia sells most of its crude oil to traders, who then 
resell the contracts on the spot market (Energy Intelligence, 
2004).
3  Exports of other raw materials (e.g. coal and iron ore), chemicals 
and manufactured goods increased considerably in 2003 and 
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Although services still contribute only 10% to 
the total value of exports and Russia is a net 
importer of services, there are some encouraging 
trends in a number of export services sectors 
new to the country. Transportation services, 
which include pipelining oil and gas, continue 
to dominate Russia’s services exports (currently 
accounting for more than a third of services 
export revenues). Since 2000, however, new 
exportable services, such as computer and 
information services and insurance, have seen 
export growth rates of over 50% on average, 
albeit from a very low base.
1.2  THE ROLE OF RAW MATERIALS IN 
DOMESTIC PRODUCTION
Domestic production appears to be well-
diversified at first glance.4 According to official 
statistics, almost half of Russia’s GDP is 
accounted for by the services sector. Both 
transport and communications and real estate 
each make up about one-quarter of total services. 
The industrial sector generates slightly more than 
40% of GDP according to the Russian Federal 
State Statistics Service (Rosstat). The remainder 
of the value added in the economy (10.9%) is 
provided by government services. Surprisingly, 
the share of mining (which includes oil and gas 
production) in Rosstat’s breakdown of Russian 
GDP was only 10.5% in 2005 (see Chart 2).
The actual size of the oil and gas industry in 
Russia may be more than twice the reported 
figure. According to a study by the World Bank 
(2004), which uses the country’s input-output 
tables to recalculate the contribution of the oil 
and gas sector to total production, its share in 
total GDP increases from the reported 8% to 
20% in 2000. The authors of the study explain 
that many Russian firms use transfer pricing to 
avoid the higher taxes in the extractive industry. 
Hence, a large portion of oil and gas revenues 
are moved from the producing subsidiary to the 
trading arm. As a result, the share of trade in 
GDP is inflated (currently over 20%) while that 
of oil and gas production (mining) is understated. 
A similar study commissioned by the Economic 
Expert Group, which works in close cooperation 
with Russia’s Ministry of Finance, found that 
the oil and gas sector share of GDP reached a 
peak of 26% in 2000 and declined to 21% in 
2003 (Gurvich, 2004). Recently, the Russian 
government has also indicated that the 
importance of the oil and gas sector to the 
Russian economy may be greater than in the 
official breakdown of GDP.5
At the same time, the shares of oil and gas 
extraction in total production have not grown 
substantially. The volume of natural gas 
produced in Russia has remained more or less 
stable in the last 15 years. Crude oil production, 
on the other hand, has grown between 8 and 11 
percent each year between 2001 and 2004, to 
Chart 2 Nominal GDP by sector, in 2002 and 
2005
(as a percentage)
Sources: Rosstat and ECB calculations.















4  Owing to data constraints, this section refers only to total 
manufacturing and total services. It should be noted that two 
important industries related to the oil and gas sector are 
accounted for within these two categories: oil refining is included 
in the figures for manufacturing, while pipeline transportation is 
part of services. According to Rosstat reports for the period 
2000-05, oil refining grew at a rate similar to the other branches 
of manufacturing, with the exception of machine building, which 
showed faster growth, and light industry, which basically 
stagnated over the period. The conclusions regarding the Dutch 
disease in Section 1.4 should therefore not be affected.
5  In early 2006, the Russian Prime Minister was quoted as saying 
that the “heating-energy complex” accounts for more than 30% 
of GDP (see Suomen Pankki – Finland’s Bank, 2006).9
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some extent reflecting a swift return towards 
full capacity following the decline of oil 
production during the 1990s. In 2005, however, 
production increased at the significantly lower 
rate of 2.4 percent. In spite of the recent growth, 
the oil sector still produces at a level 
substantially below the peak volume level of 
the late 1980s (see Chart 3).6
1.3  HAS RUSSIAN GDP GROWTH BECOME LESS 
DEPENDENT ON OIL?
Empirical studies indicate that oil prices have 
a considerable impact on GDP growth in 
Russia. Given the prominent role of the oil and 
gas sector in the country’s exports and, to a 
lesser extent, in its GDP (see Section 1.1 and 
1.2), one would expect there to be a close 
relationship between Russia’s GDP growth and 
oil prices. Indeed, empirical studies have found 
that the oil price has a significant impact on 
Russian GDP growth with long-run elasticities 
ranging from 0.15 to 0.2%.7 According to these 
estimates a permanent 10% increase in oil 
prices would, in the long run, lead to a 1.5-2% 
increase in Russian GDP.
However, the correlation has weakened in 
recent years. Since 2002, the continued steep 
increase in oil prices does not appear to have 
translated into even higher GDP growth. In 
fact, a simple correlation analysis suggests that 
Russia’s GDP growth de-coupled from oil 
prices in early 2002 and even more markedly in 
2004 (see Chart 4). One might expect this de-
coupling to be due to the strong import growth 
that may have been stimulated by the real 
appreciation of the rouble. However, the 
correlation between real import growth and the 
real effective exchange rate also appears to 
have weakened (see Chart 5). In addition, a 
Chart 3 Crude oil and natural gas 
production 
(million tonnes or tonne equivalent)
Source: BP.
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Chart 4 Real GDP growth and oil prices
Sources: Rosstat and Bloomberg.
oil price (USD/bb, Russian Urals, left-hand scale)


















Chart 5 The real effective exchange rate and 
real import growth
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6  Nevertheless, the increase in Russia’s oil production has, in 
recent years, significantly contributed to the rise in global oil 
supply.
7  See, for example, IMF (2002) in which the magnitude of this 
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tight fiscal policy, capacity constraints in the 
Russian economy and a muted response by 
investment to rising oil wealth may have 
contributed to the weakening of a simple 
correlation between Russia’s GDP growth and 
oil prices.
Since simple correlations do not capture the 
impact of other variables … The decline of the 
simple correlation between real GDP growth 
and the oil price, on the one hand, and between 
real import growth and the real effective 
exchange rate, on the other, implies neither that 
oil prices no longer have an impact on Russia’s 
GDP growth, nor that Russian imports are no 
longer stimulated by real appreciation. Only an 
econometric analysis that controls for other 
relevant variables and allows for feed-back 
between the variables can shed light on these 
issues. For example, rising oil prices may not 
only stimulate GDP growth in Russia but may 
also lead to an appreciation of the real exchange 
rate, thus offsetting the oil stimulus to some 
extent. Similarly, real import growth may 
depend not only on the real exchange rate, but 
also, as a result of wealth effects, on oil 
prices.
… a VECM is estimated, suggesting that the 
impact of the oil price on Russia’s GDP growth, 
all things being equal, has increased in recent 
years … In a cointegration framework (see 
Box 1), the long-run coefficient of the oil price 
in the GDP equation – ceteris paribus – has not 
become smaller but actually even larger in 
recent years (see Chart 6).
… while endogenous real appreciation stemming 
from rising oil prices appears to have offset this 
effect. This finding is compatible with broadly 
constant GDP growth since 2001 since the real 
exchange rate – endogenously responding to 
the rise in oil prices – appreciated during that 
period and the negative impact of the real 
exchange rate on GDP growth seems to have 
become stronger (see Chart 7). Keeping in mind 
that the data sample for the recursive estimations 
is relatively small, this would suggest that 
Russia’s GDP has become increasingly 
dependent on oil but that the growth dampening 
effect of an appreciating real exchange rate has 
also increased.
Indeed, the real exchange rate is appreciating 
in response to an oil price shock. In order to 
illustrate the reaction of real GDP and the real 
exchange rate to a permanent 1% positive shock 
to the price of oil, their responses have been 
plotted in Chart 8.
As shown in the top panel of Chart 8, the output 
response to a permanent shock in the oil price 
is positive and statistically significant. The 
cumulative effect of a 1% increase in oil prices 
on GDP, which takes into account the 
endogenous reaction of all the other variables, 
Chart 6 Recursive estimates of the oil price 
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Chart 7 Recursive estimates of the real 
effective exchange rate coefficient in the 
GDP equation
Source: Authors’ estimates.
GDP equation: coefficient of real effective exchange 
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error band (± 2 standard errors)
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is estimated to be around 0.2%. This number is 
comparable with the long-run impact of oil 
prices on Russian GDP found in other studies.8 
In the bottom panel of Chart 8, the impulse 
response of the real exchange rate suggests that 
– in the long run – the real exchange rate reacts 
to a positive shock in the oil price by 
appreciating. This finding confirms that the 
overall impact of a positive oil price shock on 
GDP is dampened by an intrinsic real 
appreciation. The significant real depreciation 
in the short run (three quarters) could be 
explained by the fact that rising oil prices lead 
directly to higher inflation in the economies of 
Russia’s trading partners (through higher import 
prices), while domestic energy prices in Russia 
are kept at below-market prices. In the longer 
run, the second round effects of higher inflation 
in Russia due to rising wages and wealth, appear 
to prevail and lead to a real appreciation of the 
rouble.9 
An error correction model suggests that real 
appreciation is stimulating imports. The 
negative impact of the real exchange rate on 
GDP in the VECM is most likely due to its 
effect on net exports. Given that Russian oil 
exports are mostly invoiced in US dollars (and 
the demand for oil is price-inelastic), the main 
channel of influence of the real exchange rate 
is most likely through imports. In order to 
demonstrate econometrically that imports are 
indeed stimulated by the real appreciation of 
the rouble, an error correction model is 
estimated for real imports (see Box 1). In this 
model, a 1% appreciation of the real effective 
exchange rate leads, in the long run, to a 0.7% 
rise in real imports.
To sum up the econometric findings presented 
above, it appears that GDP growth in Russia is 
still benefiting from high oil prices. Indeed, 
Russia’s GDP growth appears to have become 
more sensitive to the oil price while real 
appreciation – endogenously triggered by rising 
oil prices – is increasingly acting as a “buffer” 
by stimulating imports. The findings presented 
do not rule out that other factors such as a tight 
fiscal policy, capacity constraints in the Russian 
economy and a muted response by investment 
to rising oil wealth, may also have contributed 
to a more subdued response of Russia’s growth 
to rising oil prices.
Chart 8 Responses of Russia’s real GDP and 
its real effective exchange rate to a 
permanent 1% oil price shock
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8  See, for example, IMF (2002), which finds an elasticity of a 
similar magnitude.
9  In their analysis of the response of the real effective exchange 
rate of oil exporting countries to real oil prices, Habib and 
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Box 1
ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATION OF THE IMPACT OF OIL PRICES ON THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY
This box summarises the econometric methodology used in the analysis of Russia’s oil price 
dependency presented in Charts 6 to 8. 
A Vector Error Correction Model for Russia’s GDP growth and oil prices
Following Rautava (2004), a Vector-Error-Correction Model (VECM), including a long-run 
relationship between real GDP (gdp), the price of oil (oil), the real effective exchange rate 
(reer) and real government revenues (realrev), is estimated. The analysis is based on quarterly 
data, spanning from the first quarter of 1995 to the first quarter of 2006, for real GDP (seasonally 
adjusted), real government revenues (deflated with the consumer price index), oil prices (Brent 
price in U.S. dollars) and the real effective exchange rate. First, the variables are tested for 
stationarity. Results from a Phillips-Perron test suggest that the variables are non-stationary 
and integrated of order 1 (see table)1. 
To see if a linear combination of the variables results in a more stable relationship, we perform 
a trace test for cointegration.2 The test results indicate that there are two long-run relationships 
in our system; therefore a VAR with two cointegration relationships is specified in which the 
oil price is treated as weakly exogenous. Focusing on the first cointegration equation for real 
GDP, a significant positive relationship between the oil price and real GDP as well as a 
significant negative relationship between the real effective exchange rate and real GDP of the 
following form is found:3
ΔYt = ΠyYt-1 + Γy1ΔY t-1 + Γy2ΔY t-2 + ΠxXt-1 + Γx1ΔX t-1 + Γx2ΔX t-2 + Φ Dt + εt (1)
where Δ is the difference operator and the vector of endogenous variables Y can be expressed 
as Y=[gdpt,reert,realrevt]’. The vector of exogenous Variables X includes the price of oil and a 
Unit Root Phillips-Perron Tests
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: Null hypothesis: no unit root, includes constant and trend.









Variables  in  levels  -1.51  0.81 -2.65  0.26 -1.73  0.72 -2.01  0.58 
Variables in differences  -5.48  0.00  -10.28  0.00  -4.11  0.01  -5.16  0.00 
1  Other standard unit root tests suggest the same degree of integration. According to the ADF test, it cannot be ruled out that oil is 
integrated of order 2 I(2).
2  A trace test for cointegration that adjusts for a possible short-sample bias yields similar results.
3  For the VECM, different specifications have been estimated. The use of Russian Ural oil prices instead of North Sea Brent does not 
change the estimates qualitatively. The use of euro area GDP as a proxy for foreign demand does not improve the model. The same 
is true for using the fiscal deficit as a share of GDP instead of real government revenues. The model is robust regarding the choice 
of cointegration relationships. The impulse responses and long-run elasticities of GDP and the real exchange rate are almost identical, 
regardless of the number of cointegration relations. Likewise, the choice of the restrictions does not change the impulse responses 
either as the restrictions are not over-identifying. In the first cointegration relationship, the long-run effect of real government 
balances on real GDP is restricted to zero. For the sake of brevity, the second cointegration relationship of the government real 
revenue equation is not discussed in detail. In this equation the long-run effect of the real exchange rate is restricted to zero, while 
both real GDP and the oil price have a positive long-run effect on real revenues (this effect is not significant for oil, however).13
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constant restricted to the cointegration relationship. The vector of dummies D includes 
two dummies for the periods 1998:3 and 1998:4 to capture the effects of the 1998 financial 
crisis. 
The recursive estimations shown in the main text depict the concentrated model, where 
adjustment exclusively takes place towards the long run equilibrium relations. The full model, 
including all the short run adjustment yields very similar results but is more unstable in the 
beginning of the estimation period due to the relatively short baseline sample and reduced 
degrees of freedom as compared to the reduced model. As visible in charts 6 and 7, the 
coefficients of the oil price and the real effective exchange rate in the cointegration relationship 
become increasingly large – with a positive and a negative sign respectively – over time. 
However, this finding should be interpreted with caution due to the relatively short sample for 
the recursive estimation. In addition, running the model over the whole sample period still 
seems to be appropriate because the tests of the constancy of the β coefficients cannot be 
rejected.
An impulse-response analysis generated by the estimated VECM suggests (see Chart 8) that a 
shock to the oil price leads to a more muted response of real GDP than suggested by the 
corresponding coefficient of the long-term equation. The error bands for this exercise 
are created with a bootstrap procedure, according to which the errors of the estimated model 
are randomly reshuffled and used to construct new bootstrap endogenous variables. The 
parameters are then re-estimated from the generated data and impulse response functions are 
calculated. This procedure is repeated 500 times and the resulting distribution is taken to 
calculate the appropriate error bands. In this study, the confidence interval is chosen at one 
standard deviation (a confidence interval of 68% rather than 95%) as recommended by Sims 
and Zha (1999).
An error-correction-model for Russian imports
The following error correction model (ECM) for real imports is estimated for quarterly data 
from the first quarter of 1995 to the first quarter of 2006:
Δimt = -4.97    -0.65[imt-1 – (1.28 exdd t-1  + 0.70 reer t-1 + 0.11 oil t-1) + short-run dynamics + dummies
      (-4.07)  (-4.50)           (4.13)           (4.28)        (2.57)
R2 adj = 0.92; DW = 2.06; AR(1) = 0.84; AR(4) =  0.68; AR(8) = 0.53
where im is real imports of goods and services, exdd is real exports plus real domestic demand, 
oil is the US dollar price of oil and short-run dynamics is the differences of the explanatory 
variables at the lag level chosen by the optimum lag length selection criterion up to a lag length 
of 6 and dummies is the two dummies for the third and fourth quarter of 1998 capturing the 
effect of the 1998 crisis.
In this specification, the long-run elasticity of imports with respect to exports and domestic 
demand is 1.3, which is comparable with estimates for other countries. The long-run elasticity 
with respect to the real exchange rate is 0.7, suggesting that Russian imports, which are almost 
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changes in the real effective exchange rate. The long-run elasticity with respect to the oil price 
is 0.1. Thus, some of the increase in oil revenues generated by higher oil prices seems to be 
spent on imports.
1.4  IS RUSSIA SHOWING SYMPTOMS OF THE 
DUTCH DISEASE?
The prominent role of raw materials in Russia’s 
exports and the significant real appreciation of 
the Russian Rouble, may lead to concerns about 
the competitiveness of the non-oil industrial 
sector. The high importance of mineral 
extraction for Russia’s economy makes the 
country susceptible to the Dutch disease 
phenomenon. The term “Dutch disease” refers 
to a situation in which new discoveries of 
natural resources or, as in the case of Russia, 
sharp rises in commodity prices lead to an 
increase in the equilibrium real exchange rate, 
thus undermining the competitiveness of the 
other tradable sectors in the economy. As 
suggested in the academic literature (see Box 
2), the Dutch disease is associated with four 
main symptoms: i) a slowdown in manufacturing 
output, ii) a booming non-tradable sector, iii) 
an increase in real wages and iv) real exchange 
rate appreciation (Kalcheva and Oomes, 
2006).
The evidence on the first symptom – 
manufacturing sector decline – is mixed. One 
way to check for a slowdown in the non-oil 
tradable sector is to compare its growth rate 
with growth rates in the rest of the economy. In 
comparison with the manufacturing sector, 
Russia’s mining industries, which include the 
extraction of oil, natural gas, coal and other raw 
materials, grew faster in 2003, at a similar pace 
in 2004, and much more slowly in 2005 (see 
Table 2). A second approach is to examine the 
changes in the shares of the various industries 
in total output. Rosstat data indicates that the 
share of upstream oil production has increased 
marginally in real terms from 10.4% in 2000 to 
12.1% in 2004. Similarly, the share of the fuel 
industry as a whole (i.e. crude oil, natural gas 
and coal) saw a small rise from 15.8% to 17.1% 
of total industrial production. The 2004 share, 
Table 2 GDP growth by sector 
(year-on-year percentage change)
  2003 2004 2005
GDP at market prices 7.3 7.2 6.4
Agriculture, hunting, forestry 5.5 3 1.1
Fishing 3.4 2 4.6
Natural resource extraction 10.8 7.9 1.7
Manufacturing 9.5 7.8 4.4
Electricity, gas and water supply 1.6 2.1 1
Construction 13 10.2 9.7
Retail and wholesale trade; repair of vehicles and household goods 13.2 9.8 12.4
Hotels and restaurants 1.3 3 15.6
Transport and communication 7.2 10.5 6.2
Financial intermediation 9.6 4.5 6.4
Real estate and leasing 3 4.5 9.0
Public administration and defence -0.5 0.6 2.8
Education 0.9 1.2 1.9
Health and social work -3.9 1.1 1.0
Source: Rosstat and ECB calculations.
Note: Sectoral growth rates exceeding the respective annual GDP growth rate are printed in colour.15
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however, is hardly different from the respective 
figure for 1995 (16.9%). The chemical and 
machine-building industries have seen their 
shares rise slightly since 1995, while the share 
of the remaining branches has been broadly 
stable. An additional test for symptoms of the 
Dutch disease in the manufacturing sector 
involves an inspection of its profitability which 
may be negatively affected by real appreciation. 
According to World Bank figures, profitability 
in the manufacturing sector grew the least 
compared with the other sectors of the economy 
(World Bank, 2006).
In relation to the second symptom, the growth 
of the non-tradable (services) sector, especially 
construction and trade, outstripped the growth 
of the other branches of the economy (see Table 
2). While this evidence conforms to the theory 
of the Dutch disease, there are two caveats. One 
is the fact that services – such as transport, 
computer and financial services – are no longer 
necessarily non-tradable since Russia also 
exports them. In addition, it should be noted 
that the growth of the services sector may be, to 
a large extent, related to Russia’s transition to 
a market economy. In fact, as shown in Box 3, 
cross-country regressions support the notion 
that the size of the services sector in transition 
countries – relative to the size of the 
manufacturing sector – is closely related to the 
transition process.
Available evidence on labour shifting from 
manufacturing to services and natural resource 
extraction – another prediction of the Dutch 
disease hypothesis – is ambiguous. The number 
of workers in the services sector has been 
growing steadily since 1999. Employment in 
agriculture, on the other hand, has been 
declining consistently. However, the figures for 
manufacturing and the extractive industries – 
crucial for demonstrating the presence of the 
resource movement effect – give mixed signals, 
i.e. employment has been alternating between 
positive and negative growth rates in recent 
years (see Table 3).10 In addition, the empirical 
verification of the resource movement effect is 
hampered by the fact that employment in 
Russia’s mining sector is very small – currently 
1.6% of the total labour force. Owing to the 
capital-intensive structure of oil and gas 
production, any movement of labour into the 
natural resource sector from the manufacturing 
sector will be almost insignificant.
10 It should be noted that Rosstat, the International Labour 
Organisation and the World Bank give somewhat different 
figures for some categories on account of the different industrial 
classifications they use. Conclusions based on the data presented 
here should therefore be treated with caution.
Box 2 
THE DUTCH DISEASE – A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
In the basic Dutch disease framework, as developed by Corden and Neary (1982), new 
discoveries of natural resources or sharp rises in commodity prices increase employment and 
wages in the extractive sector at the expense of a country’s (tradable) manufacturing and non-
tradable sectors (the so-called “resource movement effect”). The “spending effect”, on the 
other hand, is caused by the higher wealth generated by the rise in prices and wages in the 
natural resource extraction industries and the resulting increase in aggregate demand. Since 
prices in both tradable sectors are set abroad, the overall result is higher prices in the non-
tradable sector and, consequently, higher wages and employment. The increase in the relative 
price of non-tradables with respect to tradables is, in effect, a real exchange rate appreciation. 
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Although the outcome described above represents a more efficient allocation of the factors of 
production, economic growth which is dependent on the energy sector, may prove unsustainable 
in the long run owing to the volatility of commodity prices.
Empirical tests of the symptoms of Dutch disease are inconclusive. Hutchison (1994) cannot 
confirm the existence of a clear long-term trade-off between the development of the energy and 
manufacturing sectors in the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom during the 1970s 
and 1980s. However, he shows that in the short run Norway did experience an adverse effect 
on its non-oil tradable sector, given the large size of oil income flows relative to the size of its 
economy. In the case of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, the short-term effect of their 
energy booms was the opposite: the rise in aggregate demand led to a boom in the manufacturing 
sector in the presence of domestic unemployment.
A more recent study by the IMF (2005a) which is based on data for Norway spanning from the 
late 1970s to 2004, finds both a long-term decline in the manufacturing sector and inflationary 
pressure. However, the authors point to another potential reason for the contraction of the non-
oil tradable sector, namely that higher oil prices may depress EU GDP and thus reduce EU 
demand for non-oil Norwegian exports. The IMF analysis also shows that the energy boom has 
had no impact on government expenditure on account of Norway’s prudent fiscal policy.
An empirical study by Kalcheva and Oomes (2006) on the Dutch disease symptoms in Russia 
concludes that, although some manufacturing industries are dwindling, a strong industrial 
slowdown has not occurred. At the same time, the authors find strong support for a booming 
services sector in Russia. However, they conclude that the latter could stem from post-Soviet 
transition rather than the Dutch disease. Finally, the authors also find evidence of faster real 
exchange rate appreciation as a result of high oil prices. Nonetheless, according to this study, 
the real appreciation of the rouble has not led to a loss of competitiveness.
An increase in the real wage level – the third 
testable implication of the Dutch disease – is 
observed in the data. Following the initial spike 
in oil (and other commodity) prices in 2000, the 
mining industries experienced a significant rise 
in real wages (see Chart 9). In the following 
years, real wages in all sectors grew at similar 
rates. However, this overall wage increase 
could be caused by a number of factors, 
including the spending effect (see Box 2), 
productivity gains and the recovery from the 
financial crisis.
The rouble’s real effective exchange rate has 
appreciated significantly since 1999 indicating 
“Dutch disease” challenges.11 Since 2000, 
















2001 2002 2003 2004 2005




11  It should be noted that the real exchange rate may also have 
overshot during the 1998 crisis so that its appreciation since 1999 
can be seen to some extent as a correction of an overshooting.17
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Russia’s real effective exchange rate has 
appreciated by more than 50%. However, there 
are a number of reasons for this appreciation, 
some of which go beyond the standard Dutch 
disease explanation. First, as demonstrated in 
the econometric analysis of Section 1.3, an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate can be 
seen as an equilibrium adjustment to rising oil 
prices.12 Second, an increase in government 
consumption, through its positive impact on 
inflation, may have contributed to real 
appreciation of the rouble.13 Finally, a high 
productivity differential affects the real 
exchange rate through the Balassa-Samuelson 
effect.14
Although the rouble has appreciated 
significantly in the last five years, Russia does 
not seem to have lost competitiveness. According 
to the IMF (2005), Russia’s relative price level 
is still well below that of the Baltic countries 
and Poland, which have similar levels of 
income. Similarly, the appreciation of the real 
effective exchange rate has not exceeded 
Russia’s productivity gains relative to the 
United States and the European Union. Finally, 
the country’s share of world non-oil exports has 
remained broadly unchanged since 2000.
Table 3 Employment growth by sector 
(year-on-year percentage change)
Source: International Labour Organisation.
1) 2005 data are from Rosstat.
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 1)
Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing -8.8 7.3 14.7 -13.9 -0.2 -5.6 -12.0 -4.3
Natural resource extraction -7.0 15.3 3.2 4.0 1.1 -15.5 5.7 -2.0
Manufacturing and utilities -4.3 4.6 10.9 -1.4 2.1 5.2 -5.4 -0.9
Services (non-government) -3.7 2.2 5.5 9.2 2.9 11.2 5.9 2.5
  12 A mechanical link between the terms-of-trade and the real 
effective exchange rate exists only in the case of sticky producer 
prices and perfect pass-through (see Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) 
as quoted in Cashin, Cespedes and Sahay, 2004, p. 241). 
Korhonen and Juurikkala (2006) find empirical evidence that oil 
prices have a significant positive impact on the real effective 
exchange rate in oil-exporting countries. Habib and Kalamova 
(2006) also find, as in Section 1.3 of this study, that the initial 
response of the real effective exchange to a rise of the real oil 
price in Russia, Norway and Saudi Arabia tends to be negative, 
while the long-term impact is positive.
13  See Kalcheva and Oomes (2006) who suggest that in Russia the 
effect of a 1% increase in either government consumption or the 
productivity differential explains approximately 2% of real 
exchange rate appreciation. The impact of changes in oil prices 
is lower: 0.4% or 0.7% real appreciation for each 1% increase 
in petroleum prices, depending on the specification of the 
estimated model.
14 According to Egert (2005), however, the contribution of the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect on average CPI inflation in Russia 
during the period 1996-2001 amounts to only around 1%.
Box 3
THE SHIFT TO SERVICES – A SYMPTOM OF THE DUTCH DISEASE OR A CONSEQUENCE OF THE TRANSITION 
PROCESS?
As explained in Section 1.4, one of the symptoms of the Dutch disease is a decline in the share 
of the manufacturing industry in favour of the services sector. The shift to services, however, 
is a process also linked to the transition from a planned to a market economy. This box attempts 
to disentangle these two effects empirically.
There are three main reasons for a structural shift from a dominant industrial sector to the 
prevalence of services in any economy.1 One explanation is based on the “hierarchy of needs” 
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hypothesis, according to which the demand for services rises with income levels. This demand 
view of expansion in services sector, however, is generally not supported by the empirical 
literature, because the income elasticity of the demand for services varies across types of 
service (e.g. health versus education or the arts) and between countries.2 A second approach 
considers the supply-side effects of sector productivities. Since manufacturing productivity 
rises faster than services productivity, the number of employees in the services sector is higher 
and, if their wages rise in line with the average wage, the sector’s share of this branch in 
nominal GDP will increase. Finally, changes in the inter-industry division of labour may also 
have an impact on the services sector. For example, the outsourcing of services by manufacturing 
companies to firms specialising in services (e.g. accountancy or human resources firms) leads 
to a rise in the relative service share, because the same activity is re-allocated to a different 
sector.
A particularly marked shift to services has taken place in the transition countries. In order to 
illustrate this change, a new dataset – including 23 transition countries for which appropriate 
sectoral data for the period 1994-2004 is available – is analysed.3 As can be seen from the 
left-hand panel of the chart, the ratio of manufacturing to services in 1994 was relatively high 
in the transition countries, mainly as a result of the limited availability of market-based services 
during the central planning era. In particular, countries at a relatively early stage of transition, 
as measured by the transition index of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD), had high manufacturing to services ratios. By 2004, the ratio of manufacturing to 
services had decreased – particularly in countries with a high transition index (see right-hand 
panel of the chart).4 Therefore, the rising importance of the services sector in transition countries 
appears to be closely related to the countries’ transition process to a market-based economy. 
The empirical relationship between the manufacturing/services ratio and the stage of transition 
should therefore be negative.
The stage of transition and the decline of the manufacturing sector in 1994 (left-hand panel) 
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2  Income elasticities are estimated in Summers (1985) and Curtis and Murthy (1998).
3  The described shift to services is even more pronounced, if the total industry to services ratio is used. For the analysis the 
manufacturing to services is used since it relates more closely to the Dutch disease concept.
4  Breitenfellner and Hildebrandt (2006), for example, discuss service sector developments in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 
and Slovakia in this context.19
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To show what impact the above-mentioned demand and supply factors have had on the sectoral 
composition of the transition economies during the period 1992-2004, the following unbalanced 
panel regression of 23 countries is estimated:
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in which the ratio of manufacturing to services (in terms of value added, as a percentage of 
GDP) is the dependent variable. The explanatory variables are the EBRD Transition Index5, 
real GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms6, the productivity differential of 
the industrial and the services sector 
(ProdDiff)7 and an oil interaction term. The 
last variable is the product of an oil dummy 
(which takes the value of zero, if the country 
is not a large oil exporter and 1 otherwise)8 
and the average annual Urals crude oil spot 
price.
The results of an autoregression-consistent 
random-effects estimation are reported in 
the table.9 The negative first coefficient 
indicates that the further a country moves 
along the path to market economy, the more 
its manufacturing sector declines relative to 
its services sector. Similarly, countries at an 
advanced stage in their transition process have 
relatively smaller manufacturing/services 
ratios compared with countries with slower 
paces of restructuring. In fact, each point change in the EBRD transition index decreases the 
ratio by half. 10
Contrary to the predictions of the demand theory of a shift to services, our estimates reveal that 
income per capita is positively related to the manufacturing/services ratio. In addition to the 
explanations given in the literature, which are mentioned above, an important reason for this 
result in our sample of countries is the transition shock that they experienced in the 1990s: 
manufacturing output and income per capita declined considerably and simultaneously, while 
the drop in services output occurred to a lesser extent and for shorter periods of time. Our 
Factor explaining the increase in services in 
transition economies
Dependent variable: manufacturing to service sector ratio
Source: Authors’ regressions.
Notes: Random effects estimator for unbalanced panels with 
AR(1) disturbance due to Baltagi and Wu (1999) (program in 
Stata: xtregar).
1) Indicates significance at the 1% level.
Independent variable  Coefficient estimate 
Transition index  -0.53 1)
GDP per capita (PPP) 0.32 1) 
Productivity differential 0.40 1) 
Oil interaction term  -0.20 1) 
Number of observations  161 
Number of country groups  21 
R-squared (overall)  0.63 
Wald statistic p-value  0.00 
5  A simple average of the EBRD transition indicators, which consist of a number of different scores grouped by four main categories, 
namely enterprise privatisation and restructuring, prices and trade liberalisation, financial institutions developments and infrastructure 
reforms is used for the regression. The indicators range from 1 to 4+ where 1 represents little or no change from central planning 
and 4+ represents an industrialised market economy (EBRD, 2006).
6  Purchasing power parity GDP per capita is appropriate here, since the prices of services are determined in the local market. Thus, 
the purchasing power of domestic consumers and, consequently, the demand for services do not depend on the exchange rate.
7  The productivity differential is calculated as the ratio of manufacturing output per person employed and services sector output per 
person employed.
8  The four transition economies, for which oil and gas represent a considerable share of the industrial sector, are Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan.
9  Given that random effects are used, the results have both a time and a cross-country dimension. We performed a Hausman specification 
test, which did not reject the null hypothesis that the random effects model is appropriate. The results do not change considerably, 
if fixed effects are used instead.
10 This result is robust to a number of other specifications, such as a stepwise regression or the use of the services sector share of GDP 
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second control variable, on the other hand, has the expected positive sign, i.e. an increase in 
the productivity differential leads to growth in the manufacturing sector. 
Finally, our results suggest that rising oil prices are linked to a decrease in the share of the 
manufacturing sector relative to the services sector as predicted by the Dutch disease hypothesis. 
A 10% increase in the oil price leads to a 2% decline in the manufacturing/services ratio in the 
four oil-exporting countries included in the panel.11 However, as suggested by additional 
regressions, in which the GDP shares of services and manufacturing were the dependent 
variable, the impact of oil prices on the services and the manufacturing sector is not robust. In 
these regressions, the oil price was not statistically significant in the case of services and 
negative and significant in that of manufacturing.
The main conclusion drawn from this analysis is that the shift to services in the countries of 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia is mainly driven by the transition process and sectoral 
productivity trends. However, in line with the Dutch disease predictions, there is also some 
evidence that oil prices may have a negative impact on the manufacturing sector in the oil-
exporting transition countries.
11  If the oil price is included in the equation for all countries in the sample, the estimator, unsurprisingly, is not statistically 
significant.
2 THE  MEDIUM-  AND  LONG-TERM  GROWTH 
OUTLOOK FOR RUSSIA
Despite a currently strong growth momentum, 
maintaining high growth levels in the medium 
and long term will be a challenge. This section 
examines the country’s growth prospects using 
statistical filtering techniques, growth 
accounting considerations and insights gained 
from the empirical cross-country growth 
literature. However, owing to a combination of 
major structural changes in the Russian 
economy, the presence of singular factors that 
have underpinned growth in recent years and 
poor data quality, these considerations are 
supplemented with more qualitative 
assessments.
The section is organised as follows:
–  First, standard statistical filtering techniques 
are used to gauge Russia’s current growth 
potential (Section 2.1).
–  Second, Russia’s growth potential is put into 
a cross-country perspective, while bearing in 
mind “Russia-specific” factors and long-
term challenges (Section 2.2).
2.1 TIME  SERIES  CONSIDERATIONS
Standard statistical filtering techniques suggest 
that Russia’s potential growth rate could be 
4-6% per annum, depending on the time-span 
taken into consideration.15 The application of 
a conventional two-sided Hodrick-Prescott 
filter16 to Russian GDP data since 1995 yields a 
smoothed trend series that exhibits a pronounced 
swing of trend growth from around -0.5% in 
1996 to more than 6.5% in 2003, before levelling 
off slightly to around 6% in the first quarter of 
2006 (see Chart 10).17 The large changes in the 
trend growth rate mainly reflect the mechanical 
smoothing around the 1998 crisis. Likewise, 
the application of a Hodrick-Prescott filter to 
annual GDP data available since 1980 yields a 
trend series that shows trend growth falling 
from around 3% in the early 1980s to -4% 
15  This finding is broadly in line with the latest assessment by IMF 
staff, which uses a production function approach and suggests 
that Russia’s growth potential may have increased to 
6.25-6.5%.
16  The results do not change qualitatively if a bandpass filter, using 
the Baxter-King approximation, is used instead.
17  It should be noted that statistical filtering techniques smooth a 
time series in a mechanical way. The use of the smoothed values 
for forecasting purposes is therefore only indicative since 
changes due to future developments of growth determinants are 
not taken into account.21
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during Russia’s transition recession, before 
subsequently recovering to around 4%.18 
Owing to the high volatility of Russia’s economic 
performance over the past few decades, 
projections for potential growth that are based 
on historical Russian GDP data have to be 
interpreted with caution. Russia’s transition 
from a planned to a market-based economy 
which led to a sharp contraction in output in the 
period 1991-95 and the financial crisis of 1998 
marked deep structural breaks in the country’s 
historical GDP series. The ranges for potential 
growth as suggested by the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter are therefore only a rough indication of 
trend growth.
A “second transition” may be needed. While one 
could argue that the transition from a planned to 
a market-based economy is over – suggesting 
that the transition recession during 1991-95 
should not be considered in a smoothing exercise 
– it should be borne in mind that some sectors of 
the Russian economy may still not be 
internationally competitive. Indeed, as many 
branches of the economy continue to be sheltered 
from international competition (e.g. through 
tariffs and import quotas) and have access to 
energy at artificially low prices, inefficient 
production structures may still be widespread. 
Consequently, more restructuring may be needed 
once more sectors are fully exposed to 
international competition following the accession 
of Russia to the World Trade Organisation.19
In addition, the high growth rates of recent 
years have been mostly driven by strong 
increases in total factor productivity that are 
unlikely to last in the long run. A qualitative 
decomposition of Russia’s historical growth 
rates into its traditional components of changes 
to labour utilisation, changes to the capital 
stock and increases in total factor productivity 
(TFP) suggests that GDP growth over the past 
decade has been almost exclusively driven by 
TFP growth since investment rates and labour 
force growth have been low.20 These large gains 
Chart 10 Trend growth according to the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter
(percentages year-on-year)
Sources: Rosstat, IMF and ECB calculations.
Notes: Smoothing factor for HP filtering lambda set to 1600 
(quarterly series) and 100 (annual series). Annual series 
converted to quarterly frequency using a standard cubic 
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Chart 11 Gross fixed capital formation
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18  Russian GDP data dating prior to 1995 should be treated with 
caution since they are unlikely to have matched international 
dissemination standards. In addition, prior to 1992, prices were 
not set by market mechanisms.
19  The restructuring of non-competitive industries can lead to a 
(temporary) decline of output if one assumes that growth in new 
industries takes place only after some time.
20  As pointed out in Ahrend (2004, p. 12), a more formal growth 
accounting exercise is hampered by the fact that Russian capital 
stock data are not very reliable, since investment undertaken in 
Soviet times is difficult to evaluate. Nevertheless, tentative 
estimates presented in Ahrend (2004) appear to confirm the 
claim that Russian growth has been almost exclusively driven 
by TFP growth. In fact, according to Ahrend’s framework which 
relies on a Cobb-Douglas production function with standard 
labour and capital elasticities, neither changes to labour 
utilisation nor changes to the capital stock made a significant 
contribution to Russian growth in the period 1995-2002.
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in productivity have been possible on account 
of capacity under-utilisation, which is unlikely 
to last in the long run.
In fact, growth accounting considerations 
suggest that investment would have to rise 
significantly to maintain high growth rates in 
Russia. As suggested by above description of 
the decomposition of Russia’s recent growth, 
future growth will require more investment to 
allow for an expansion of Russia’s capital stock. 
In addition, the ratio of investment to GDP has 
proven to be a significant and robust determinant 
of economic growth in many cross-country 
studies.21 However, despite a booming economy, 
high marginal returns in a catching-up economy 
and low interest rates, investment in Russia has 
remained low by international standards and 
has stagnated at around 18% of GDP (see Chart 
11).22 
2.2 CROSS-COUNTRY  CONSIDERATIONS
Cross-country evidence on economic growth 
suggests that it will be a challenge to maintain 
currently high growth rates over the longer 
term. As shown in Chart 12, in the period 1961-
2002 the historical mean in a sample of around 
100 countries was around 2% per annum.23 
Likewise, real per capita growth rates above 
5% per annum have historically been rare. In 
addition, Russia may be an example of “growth 
acceleration” as suggested in Hausmann et al. 
(2004). According to this study, positive 
external shocks tend to lead to growth 
accelerations that phase out after 7-8 years.
In addition to cross-country evidence on growth, 
a look at Russia-specific factors is necessary. 
While empirical evidence from large cross-
country panels reveals some information about 
historically common average growth rates, a 
look at Russia-specific factors complements an 
assessment of the country’s growth prospects. 
In particular, Russia’s large geographic size, 
abundant natural resources, the lack of 
investment in the oil and gas sector, relatively 
high stock of human capital and challenging 
demographic and public health trends stand out 
as special circumstances and are analysed 
below.
The impact of Russia’s large geographic size on 
its growth outlook is not clear-cut. On the one 
hand, the academic literature on country size 
and growth suggests that a large country may 
benefit from its size in a number of ways. For 
example, large countries may enjoy economies 
of scale in the production of public goods, a 
large market size and the accompanying 
competitive pressures, as well as better 
provision of insurance to regions affected by 
imperfectly correlated shocks. On the other 
hand, a large size can have costs related to the 
heterogeneity of preferences that may make the 
provision of public goods more difficult. In 
addition, as shown by Gallup, Sachs and 
Mellinger (1998), high transportation costs in a 
country may have a negative impact on 
economic growth.24 A recent empirical study by 
Alesina et al. (2005) shows that both size and 
trade openness benefit growth, but the 
importance of size declines with international 
integration. Therefore, as Russia continues its 
international integration (e.g. through 
membership of the World Trade Organisation), 
the net effect of its large size becomes more 
uncertain.
An abundance of natural resources can have a 
negative impact on growth. With the exception 
of Iran, most major oil-exporting countries, 
including Russia, experienced lower growth 
rates than the world average in the periods after 
the second and before the most recent oil price 
21 See, for example, the seminal paper by Levine and Renelt 
(1992) which demonstrates there is a robust relationship that 
explains per capita growth as a function of the share of 
investment to GDP, a country’s income level, the population 
growth rate and the secondary school enrolment rate.
22 Most observers hold the view that low investment ratios in 
Russia reflect to a large extent uncertainties with regard to the 
investment climate, in particular with respect to the enforcement 
of property rights (see, for example, IMF, 2006, p. 23).
23  The sample includes all industrial and developed countries for 
which data are available in the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators database since 1961.
24  Owing to extremely large distances between areas of population, 
natural resources and business centres, transportation costs in 
Russia are about three times international standards (see Beck 
and Schularick, 2003).23
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shock (see Chart 13). While this observation 
may to some extent reflect country-specific 
factors (e.g. the transition recession in Russia) 
and the drop in and the volatility of oil prices 
during that period, it has been shown that an 
abundance of natural resources can be a curse 
rather than a blessing. In fact, controlling for 
other standard growth determinants, Sachs and 
Warner (1995) show that the natural resource 
endowments may have a negative impact on 
growth. More recently, it has been shown that 
this effect applies, in particular, to countries in 
which institutional arrangements favour rent-
seeking.25 As Russia, while not explicitly 
included in this study, scores low in most 
surveys on the quality of institutions26, the 
“resource curse” argument may play a role for 
Russia’s long-term growth outlook.27
As the oil and gas industry is likely to remain 
the main driver of economic growth for some 
time, investment in this sector is of particular 
importance. Notwithstanding the emergence of 
new businesses in Russia, economic 
diversification is a gradual process that may be 
hampered by real appreciation and a persistent 
lack of financing of private investment through 
the banking system.28 Despite the importance of 
the oil and gas sector in Russia oil production 
growth has started to decelerate which 
underscores the need for large investments in 
these industries.29 Without massive new 
investment, oil and gas production could start 
to decline as early as in the next decade (Bank 
of Finland, 2006).
Russia’s high stock of human capital suggests a 
more promising growth outlook. The empirical 
growth literature has unambiguously shown 
that human capital has a positive impact on 
economic growth.  30 In Russia, the stock of 
human capital – particularly with respect to 
Chart 12 Distribution of average real per 
capita GDP growth rates (1961-2002)
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25  See Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006).
26 For example, according to the World Bank survey “Doing 
Business in 2007” Russia only ranks 96 in the world (out of 175 
countries) in terms of “ease of doing business”.
27  In addition, Lederman and Maloney (2003) have shown that the 
“resource curse” argument applies, in particular, if raw material 
exports are concentrated in a few products, as in the case of 
Russia.
28  Credit to the private sector has been recently growing fast at a 
nominal rate of around 40% per annum and some progress in the 
area of banking sector reform has been made. Nevertheless, 
80% of investments in 2005 were financed through retained 
profits (see OECD, 2006).
29  According to the International Energy Agency, the Russian oil 
sector needs around USD 14 billion annually in order to 
maintain moderate growth rates as indicated in the country’s 
energy strategy.
30  For example, the seminal contributions by Barro (1991) and 
Levine and Renelt (1992) demonstrated the importance of 
human capital for per capita growth. However, it should be 
noted that the ideal measure for the impact of human capital on 
growth would be additions to the stock of human capital, 
measured as average years of education of a country’s working 
population (see Bergheim, 2005).
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university education – has remained higher 
compared with other catching-up economies 
which points to a more promising growth 
outlook for Russia (see Chart 14).31 
In the long-term, negative demographic effects 
are likely to depress headline growth. In 
addition to the challenges of maintaining high 
per capita growth as mentioned above, overall 
GDP growth in Russia is likely to be negatively 
affected by a declining population and 
workforce. In fact, owing to a combination of 
low fertility and high mortality rates, Russia’s 
population has been declining since 1993. 
According to the United Nations Population 
Fund (UNFPA, 2006), the rate of decline could 
stabilise at 0.4% per annum. This would imply 
that the population will shrink from 142 million 
in 2005 to 139 million by 2010 and 112 million 
by 2050.
Public health may be negatively affected by the 
spread of HIV, possibly affecting economic 
growth in the long-term. According to Hamers 
et al. (2006), Russia is among the countries in 
the EU Neighbouring Regions with the highest 
rate (more than 200) of HIV infections per 
million inhabitants. While the rate of newly 
registered infected individuals in Russia has 
trended downwards recently, this development 
is to some extent due to a reduction of HIV 
testing (UNAIDS 2006). Around 80% of 
HIV-infected individuals in Russia are between 
15 and 30 years of age, i.e. the economically 
productive age group. According to World Bank 
(2002) estimates, without preventive policies 
or treatment, this could lower annual growth by 
half a percentage point by 2010.
3 CONCLUSION
The oil and gas sector is of growing importance 
for the Russian economy, but its rising share is 
less pronounced in real terms. In addition, other 
sectors, particularly services, are also 
expanding. Compared with other oil-exporting 
economies, the role of the oil and gas sector is 
still relatively moderate as Russia has a 
significant industrial base and a high level of 
human capital. 
The apparent de-coupling of Russia’s GDP 
growth from the oil price in recent years does 
not necessarily imply that growth is no longer 
sensitive to oil price fluctuations. In fact, the 
econometric findings presented suggest that 
one reason for the de-coupling of Russia’s GDP 
growth from oil prices could be the surge of 
imports which may have been stimulated by 
real appreciation.
The empirical evidence on the symptoms of the 
Dutch disease is mixed. While some typical 
signs of the Dutch disease such as a growing 
service sector and real appreciation are 
observed, they may also stem from other factors 
such as economic restructuring and catching-
up.
Russia’s current growth momentum is strong, 
suggesting that robust growth rates may be 
maintained over the next couple of years. In 
fact, statistical filtering techniques, while 
subject to many caveats, suggest that potential 
growth is currently standing at around 4-6% per 
annum.
31  However, in its PISA studies, the OECD has pointed to serious 
shortcomings in the Russian education system that will make it 
difficult to maintain Russia’s high human capital stock.
Chart 14 Tertiary school enrolment 
(as a percentage of age group1))
Source: World Development Indicators. 
1 The ratio of total enrolment to the population of the age group 



























Hungary Romania Mexico Brazil China25
ECB 
Occasional Paper No 58
March 2007
Cross-country estimates of economic growth 
indicate that it will be a challenge to maintain 
the current growth momentum over the medium 
and long term. In fact, other countries have 
grown on average at a much slower pace than 
Russia currently does. A review of several 
Russia-specific factors such as the risk of the 
Dutch disease, abundance of natural resources 
and low investment suggest that the medium 
and long-term growth outlook for Russia may 
be even more challenging than for an “average” 
catching-up economy. At the same time, other 
characteristics, such as the high stock of human 
capital, point to a more promising outlook.
The increase of the current low investment rates 
appears to be the key policy variable for 
safeguarding high growth. Improvements to the 
investment climate and continued progress in 
the area of banking sector reform appear, at this 
stage, to be the key policy variables for ensuring 
that the sizable necessary investments –
particularly with regard to the expansion of 
transport capacity in the oil and gas sector – are 
undertaken.
Long-term challenges to Russia’s growth 
outlook appear to be manageable through 
appropriate policy measures. In order to 
safeguard growth in the long term, public 
spending should address demographic and 
health problems with a high priority. 
3 CONCLUSION26
ECB 
Occasional Paper No 58
March 2007
REFERENCES
Ahrend, R. (2004), “Accounting for Russia’s Post-Crisis Growth”, OECD Economics Department 
Working Papers, No. 404, OECD Publishing.
Ahrend, R. (December 2005), “Can Russia break the “resource curse?”, Eurasian-Geography-
and-Economics, 46(8), pp. 584-609.
Alesina, A., Spolaore, E. and R. Wacziarg (2005), “Trade, growth and the size of countries” in 
P. Aghion & S. Durlauf (eds), Handbook of Economic Growth, 1b, Amsterdam, North Holland.
Aslund, A. (December 2005), “Russian resources: curse or rents?”, Eurasian-Geography-and-
Economics, 46(8), pp. 610-17.
Baltagi, B. and P. Wu (1999), “Unequally spaced panel data regressions with AR(1) disturbances”, 
Econometric Theory, 15, pp. 814-823.
Barro, Robert J. (1991), “Economic Growth in a Cross-Section of Countries”, Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, Vol. 106, pp. 407-43.
Bank of Finland (2006), “Russian Energy Sector, Prospect and Implications for Russian Growth, 
Economic Policy and Energy Supply” memorandum prepared for the International Relations 
committee in August 2006, unpublished.
Beck, R. and M. Schularick (2003), “Russia 2010: It’s a Russian Bear, Not a Bull”, Deutsche Bank 
Research, International Topics, March 2003.
Bergheim, S. (2005), “Human Capital is the Key to Growth”, Deutsche Bank Research, Current 
Issues, Global Growth Centres, August 2005.
Breitenfellner, A. and A. Hildebrandt (2006), “High employment with low productivity? The 
service sector as a determinant of economic development”, Monetary Policy and the Economy, 
Q1/06, Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Vienna, Austria.
Cashin, P., Cespedes, L. F. and R. Sahay (2004), “Commodity Currencies and the Real Exchange 
Rate”, Journal of Development Economics 75, pp. 239-268.
Corden, W. M. and J. P. Neary (December 1982), “Booming sector and de-industrialisation in a 
small open economy”, The Economic Journal, 92 (368), pp. 825-848.
Curtis, D. C. A. and K. S. R. Murthy (1998), “Economic growth and restructuring: a test of 
unbalanced growth models – 1977-1992”, Applied Economic Letters 5, pp. 777-780.
De Haan, J. and, J.-E. Sturm (2005), “Determinants of long-term growth: New results applying 
robust estimation and extreme bounds analysis”, Empirical Economics 30, pp. 597-617.
Egert, B. (2005), “Equilibrium Exchange Rates in Southeastern Europe, Russia, Ukraine and 
Turkey: Healthy or (Dutch) Diseased?”, Economic Systems, 29:2, June.27
ECB 
Occasional Paper No 58
March 2007
Energy Intelligence (July 2004), Understanding the oil and gas industries, New York, NY, Energy 
Intelligence.
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2005), Transition report 2005: business in 
transition, London, UK, EBRD.
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2006), Transition report 2006: finance in 
transition, London, UK, EBRD.
Hamers F., Devaux I., Alix J., Nardone A. (2006), “HIV/AIDS in Europe: trends and EU-wide 
priorities”, Eurosurveillance 2006 11 (11).
Gallup, J. L., Sachs, J. D. and A. D. Mellinger (1998), “Geography and Economic Growth”, paper 
prepared for the Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington, DC.
Gurvich, E.T. (October 2004), “Makroekonomicheskaya otsenka roli Rossiyskovo neftegazovovo 
sektora” (A macroeconomic assessment of the role of the Russian oil and gas sector), Voprosy 
Ekonomiki, 10/04 (in Russian).
Habib, M. and Kalamova, M. (2006), “Are there oil currencies? The real exchange rate of oil-
exporting countries”, mimeo, European Central Bank.
Hausmann, R., L. Pritchett and D. Rodrik (2004), “Growth Accelerations”, Faculty Research 
Working Papers Series RWP04-030, Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government, 
July.
Hutchison, M. M. (April 1994), “Manufacturing sector resiliency to energy booms: empirical 
evidence from Norway, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom”, Oxford Economic Papers, 
New Series, 46 (2), pp. 311-329.
International Monetary Fund (2005), Russian Federation: Staff report for the 2005 Article IV 
consultation, Washington, DC, IMF, August.
International Monetary Fund (2005), Norway: selected issues, Washington, DC, IMF, June.
International Monetary Fund (2006), Russian Federation: 2006 Article IV Consultation – Staff 
Report; Staff Statement; and Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion, 
December 2006.
International Labour Organization (2006), Labour statistics database, online at http://laborsta.ilo.
org.
Kalcheva, K. and N. Oomes (2006), Dutch disease: does Russia have the symptoms, Helsinki, 
Finland, Bank of Finland BOFIT.
Komulainen, T., Korhonen, I., Korhonen, V., Rautava, J. and P. Sutela (2003), Russia: Growth 
prospects and policy debates, BOFIT Online 3/2003.
REFERENCES28
ECB 
Occasional Paper No 58
March 2007
Korhonen, I. and T. Juurikkala (2006), “Equilibrium exchange rates in oil-dependent countries” 
forthcoming BOFIT Discussion Paper, Bank of Finland BOFIT, Helsinki, Finland.
Lederman, D. and W. F. Maloney (2003), “Trade Structure and Growth”, World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper, No. 3025, April 2003.
Levine, R. and D. Renelt (1992), “A Sensitvity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth Regressions”, 
American Economic Review, Vol. 82 No. 4, pp. 942-63 (September 1992).
Mehlum, H., Moene, K. and R. Torvik (2006), “Institutions and the Resource Curse”, The Economic 
Journal, 116 (January), pp. 1-20.
OECD (2006), Economic survey of the Russian Federation 2006, Paris, November 2006.
Rautava, J. (2004), “The role of oil prices and the real exchange rate in Russia’s economy: a 
cointegration approach”, Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 315-327.
Schettkat, R. and L. Yocarini, (2003), “The shift to services: a review of the literature”, IZA 
Discussion Paper, No. 964, Bonn, Germany, Institute for the Study of Labor.
Sachs, J. D. and Warner, A. M. (1995), “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth”, 
NBER Working Paper, No. W5398, December 1995.
Sims, C. A., and T. Zha (1999), “Error Bands for Impulse Responses”, Econometrica, 67 (5), 
pp.1113-1155.
Summers, R. (1985), “Services in the international economy”, in R. P. Inman. (ed.), Managing the 
Service Economy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 27-48.
UNAIDS (2006), AIDS Epidemic Update 2006, Geneva, December 2006.
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) (2006), State of World Population 2006.
World Bank (2002), Russian Economic Report No. 3, The World Bank, Moscow, Russia, May 
2002.
World Bank (2003), Russian Economic Report No. 6, The World Bank, Moscow, Russia, August 
2003.
World Bank (2004), Russian Economic Report No. 7, The World Bank, Moscow, Russia, February 
2004.
World Bank (2005), World Development Indicators.
World Bank (2005), From transition to development: a country economic memorandum for the 
Russian Federation, The World Bank, Moscow, Russia, March 2005.
World Bank (2006), Russian Economic Report No. 12, The World Bank, Moscow, Russia, April 
2006.29
ECB 




1  “The impact of the euro on money and bond markets” by J. Santillán, M. Bayle and
C. Thygesen, July 2000.
2  “The effective exchange rates of the euro” by L. Buldorini, S. Makrydakis and C. Thimann, 
February 2002.
3  “Estimating the trend of M3 income velocity underlying the reference value for monetary 
growth” by C. Brand, D. Gerdesmeier and B. Roffia, May 2002.
4  “Labour force developments in the euro area since the 1980s” by V. Genre and
R. Gómez-Salvador, July 2002.
5  “The evolution of clearing and central counterparty services for exchange-traded derivatives 
in the United States and Europe: a comparison” by D. Russo, T. L. Hart and A. Schönenberger, 
September 2002.
6  “Banking integration in the euro area” by I. Cabral, F. Dierick and J. Vesala, 
December 2002.
7  “Economic relations with regions neighbouring the euro area in the ‘Euro Time Zone’” by   
F. Mazzaferro, A. Mehl, M. Sturm, C. Thimann and A. Winkler, December 2002.
8  “An introduction to the ECB’s survey of professional forecasters” by J. A. Garcia, 
September 2003.
9  “Fiscal adjustment in 1991-2002: stylised facts and policy implications” by M. G. Briotti, 
February 2004.
10  “The acceding countries’ strategies towards ERM II and the adoption of the euro: an analytical 
review” by a staff team led by P. Backé and C. Thimann and including O. Arratibel, O. Calvo-
Gonzalez, A. Mehl and C. Nerlich, February 2004.
11  “Official dollarisation/euroisation: motives, features and policy implications of current cases” 
by A. Winkler, F. Mazzaferro, C. Nerlich and C. Thimann, February 2004.
12  “Understanding the impact of the external dimension on the euro area: trade, capital flows 
and other international macroeconomic linkages“ by R. Anderton, F. di Mauro and F. Moneta, 
March 2004.
13  “Fair value accounting and financial stability” by a staff team led by A. Enria and including 
L. Cappiello, F. Dierick, S. Grittini, A. Maddaloni, P. Molitor, F. Pires and P. Poloni, 
April 2004.
14  “Measuring financial integration in the euro area” by L. Baele, A. Ferrando, P. Hördahl,   






Occasional Paper No 58
March 2007
15  “Quality adjustment of European price statistics and the role for hedonics” by H. Ahnert and 
G. Kenny, May 2004.
16  “Market dynamics associated with credit ratings: a literature review” by F. Gonzalez, F. Haas, 
R. Johannes, M. Persson, L. Toledo, R. Violi, M. Wieland and C. Zins, June 2004.
17 “Corporate ‘excesses’ and financial market dynamics” by A. Maddaloni and D. Pain, 
July 2004.
18  “The international role of the euro: evidence from bonds issued by non-euro area residents” 
by A. Geis, A. Mehl and S. Wredenborg, July 2004.
19  “Sectoral specialisation in the EU: a macroeconomic perspective” by MPC task force of the 
ESCB, July 2004.
20  “The supervision of mixed financial services groups in Europe” by F. Dierick, August 2004.
21  “Governance of securities clearing and settlement systems” by D. Russo, T. Hart, M. C. 
Malaguti and C. Papathanassiou, October 2004.
22  “Assessing potential output growth in the euro area: a growth accounting perspective” by 
A. Musso and T. Westermann, January 2005.
23  “The bank lending survey for the euro area” by J. Berg, A. van Rixtel, A. Ferrando, G. de 
Bondt and S. Scopel, February 2005.
24  “Wage diversity in the euro area: an overview of labour cost differentials across industries” 
by V. Genre, D. Momferatou and G. Mourre, February 2005.
25  “Government debt management in the euro area: recent theoretical developments and changes 
in practices” by G. Wolswijk and J. de Haan, March 2005.
26  “The analysis of banking sector health using macro-prudential indicators” by L. Mörttinen,   
P. Poloni, P. Sandars and J. Vesala, March 2005.
27  “The EU budget – how much scope for institutional reform?” by H. Enderlein, J. Lindner,   
O. Calvo-Gonzalez, R. Ritter, April 2005. 
28  “Reforms in selected EU network industries” by R. Martin, M. Roma, I. Vansteenkiste,   
April 2005.
29  “Wealth and asset price effects on economic activity”, by F. Altissimo, E. Georgiou,  T. Sastre, 
M. T. Valderrama, G. Sterne, M. Stocker, M. Weth, K. Whelan, A. Willman, June 2005.
30  “Competitiveness and the export performance of the euro area”, by a Task Force of the 
Monetary Policy Committee of the European System of Central Banks, June 2005.
31  “Regional monetary integration in the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)” 
by M. Sturm and N. Siegfried, June 2005.31
ECB 
Occasional Paper No 58
March 2007
32  “Managing financial crises in emerging market economies: experience with the involvement 
of private sector creditors” by an International Relations Committee task force, July 2005.
33 “Integration of securities market infrastructures in the euro area” by H. Schmiedel, 
A. Schönenberger, July 2005.
34  “Hedge funds and their implications for financial stability” by T. Garbaravicius and F. Dierick, 
August 2005.
35  “The institutional framework for financial market policy in the USA seen from an EU 
perspective” by R. Petschnigg, September 2005. 
36  “Economic and monetary integration of the new Member States: helping to chart the route” 
by J. Angeloni, M. Flad and F. P. Mongelli, September 2005.
37  “Financing conditions in the euro area” by L. Bê Duc, G. de Bondt, A. Calza, D. Marqués 
Ibáñez, A. van Rixtel and S. Scopel, September 2005.
38 “Economic reactions to public finance consolidation: a survey of the literature” by 
M. G. Briotti, October 2005.
39  “Labour productivity in the Nordic EU countries: a comparative overview and explanatory 
factors – 1998-2004” by A. Annenkov and C. Madaschi, October 2005.
40 “What does European institutional integration tell us about trade integration?” by 
F. P. Mongelli, E. Dorrucci and I. Agur, December 2005.
41 “Trends and patterns in working time across euro area countries 1970-2004: causes 
and consequences” by N. Leiner-Killinger, C. Madaschi and M. Ward-Warmedinger, 
December 2005.
42  “The New Basel Capital Framework and its implementation in the European Union” by 
F. Dierick, F. Pires, M. Scheicher and K. G. Spitzer, December 2005.
43  “The accumulation of foreign reserves” by an International Relations Committee Task Force, 
February 2006.
44  “Competition, productivity and prices in the euro area services sector” by a Task Force of the 
Monetary Policy Committee of the European System of Central banks, April 2006.
45 “Output growth differentials across the euro area countries: Some stylised facts” by 
N. Benalal, J. L. Diaz del Hoyo, B. Pierluigi and N. Vidalis, May 2006.
46  “Inflation persistence and price-setting behaviour in the euro area – a summary of the IPN 
evidence”, by F. Altissimo, M. Ehrmann and F. Smets, June 2006.
47  “The reform and implementation of the stability and growth pact” by R. Morris, H. Ongena 






Occasional Paper No 58
March 2007
48  “Macroeconomic and financial stability challenges for acceding and candidate countries” by 
the International Relations Committee Task Force on Enlargement, July 2006.
49  “Credit risk mitigation in central bank operations and its effects on financial markets: the case 
of the Eurosystem” by U. Bindseil and F. Papadia, August 2006.
50  “Implications for liquidity from innovation and transparency in the European corporate bond 
market” by M. Laganá, M. Peřina, I. von Köppen-Mertes and A. Persaud, August 2006. 
51  “Macroeconomic implications of demographic developments in the euro area” by A. Maddaloni, 
A. Musso, P. Rother, M. Ward-Warmedinger and T. Westermann, August 2006.
52 “Cross-border labour mobility within an enlarged EU” by F. F. Heinz and M. Ward-
Warmedinger, October 2006.
53  “Labour productivity developments in the euro area” by R. Gomez-Salvador, A. Musso, 
M. Stocker and J. Turunen, October 2006.
54  “Quantitative quality indicators for statistics – an application to euro area balance of payment 
statistics” by V. Damia and C. Picón Aguilar, November 2006.
55 “Globalisation and euro area trade: Interactions and challenges” by U. Baumann and 
F. di Mauro, February 2007.
56  “Assessing fiscal soundness: Theory and practice” by N. Giammarioli, C. Nickel, P. Rother, 
J.-P. Vidal, March 2007.
57  “Understanding price developments and consumer price indices in south-eastern Europe” by 
S. Herrmann and E. K. Polgar, March 2007.
58 “Long-term growth prospects for the Russian economy” by R. Beck, A. Kamps and 
E. Mileva, March 2007.ISSN 1607148-4
9 771607 148006
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES
NO 58 / MARCH 2007
LONG-TERM GROWTH 
PROSPECTS FOR THE 
RUSSIAN ECONOMY 
by Roland Beck, Annette Kamps 
and Elitza Mileva